In this interview, Anna Gopsill asks Ida Marie Savio Vammen about her research on Senegal – reflecting on the interesting findings from the country and highlighting the importance of including Senegal in the project EFFEXT. The EFFEXT project examined the effects of externalisation of EU borders into Africa and the Middle East, the project included six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Libya, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Lebanon.
Anna: What made Senegal an interesting case to include in this project?
Ida: Senegal is a compelling case when examining the influence of European externalization initiatives on African partner countries. For nearly two decades, the European Union and individual member states—particularly Spain, France, and more recently Germany—have in different ways attempted to curb irregular migration, both overland and especially at sea. The initiatives were set in motion by the so-called ‘Cayuco crisis’ in 2006, where over 30.000 migrants, predominantly from Senegal, reached the Spanish Canary Islands by boat and were later spurred by the European refugee crisis and renewed activity on the dangerous Atlantic sea route since late 2019.
Migration and remittances play a vital socioeconomic and cultural role in the country which has a long tradition of cross-border mobility, both within the region and internationally, linked to colonial times but also predating them. In conjunction with economic difficulties and youth employment, this fact makes it difficult for the heavily funded externalization initiatives to meet their objective which is recognized by most of the European and Senegalese policy actors I have talked to during fieldwork.
Over the years, the Senegalese government has simultaneously accommodated and resisted EU pressures. They have had to navigate donor interest that comes with access to development funding and funding to build the national security apparatus with sensitive issues such as forced return, which remains politically sensitive nationally and their interest in strengthening diaspora contributions.
Anna: When considering migration governance in Senegal, who are the main actors involved?
EU interest and funding for migration and security-related projects and the influence of international organizations, especially the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have fostered institutional fragmentation and competition for migration-related resources for institutional capacity building and funding. At the governmental level, key actors include the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for the police, including border control, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter is represented by the Directorate General for the Diaspora (DGSE), which manages diaspora relations and programs such as the BAOS, and the Directorate General for Consular Affairs, responsible for issuing travel documents and participating in return and repatriation processes. Other governmental ministries are involved as well, such as the Directorate General for Employment, which negotiates labor agreements with third countries, and the Ministry of Justice, particularly in relation to anti-trafficking efforts.
When attempting to draft the country’s National Migration Policy (NMP), the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Cooperation and the Directorate General of Human Capital Development led a policy process from 2015-2018 (funded by the IOM) that ultimately failed. More recently, IOM has again played a significant funding role in the adoption of Senegal’s new NMP. In this case, the Ministry of Finance, pressured by the EU, played a decisive role in pushing for the policy’s finalization, spearheaded by former Prime Minister Amadou Ba’s office.
Anna: Are there any specific ongoing challenges in the country?
It remains uncertain how the new government under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko will address migration issues and if they will adopt this policy or pursue a different path in line with their agenda to enhance Senegal’s sovereignty and reduce foreign dependencies and debt.
Anna: While the project findings are still being crystallised, has any one finding emerged from your research in Senegal?
My research in Senegal highlights the multifaceted ripple effects of EU and European actors’ externalization initiatives and discourses, particularly how they influence civil society actors’ and activists’ engagement with migration issues and policies. Civil society organizations (CSOs) often become key intermediaries in the migration industry, implementing EU-funded projects as they struggle for financial support. At the same time, other CSOs seek to challenge and subvert the European border regime and the Eurocentric narratives around migration.
Anna: Finally, what have you found to be interesting when researching Senegal?
One of the most intriguing aspects has been the contestation from below of European externalization efforts. For instance, while the EU has heavily invested in campaigns aimed at deterring migration from Senegal, it has been interesting to follow activist-led campaigns in Dakar that have emerged to provide counternarratives, challenging Eurocentric migration policies and the associated border violence.
Moreover, observing the role of CSOs in the recent migration policy process has been fascinating. On one hand, they advocate for a migration policy that prioritizes Senegal’s interests over those of the EU. On the other hand, there appears to be a recurring cycle of “performative inclusion” of these actors in policy-making, leading their initial critical engagement to evolve into more reluctant compliance with the broader European migration agenda. It will, therefore, be interesting to see whether some of these CSOs’ critical perspectives will resonate more with the new government ideals and find ways to disrupt the dominant European migration agenda, which seems to continue to overshadow Senegal’s interests. Should the EU truly seek a more equitable partnership with Senegal, it is vital to include and seriously consider the perspectives of local actors and CSOs on mobility and migration.
