Reflections

In this interview, Anna Gopsill asks Oliver Bakewell and Kiya Gezahegne about their research on Ethiopia. In it, they reflect on the motivation behind including Ethiopia in the project and highlight interesting findings from the EFFEXT project research. The EFFEXT project examined the effects of externalisation of EU borders into Africa and the Middle East, the project included six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Libya, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Anna: Ethiopia was included in the EFFEXT project as one of the six case countries. What was the main motivation behind including Ethiopia as a comparison country?

Kiya and Oliver: Ethiopia is both an important origin and destination for migration in the Horn of Africa. With a large and young population, chronic political and economic instability, insecurity and conflict along with deteriorating environmental conditions, it is often seen as having all the ingredients for generating huge numbers of international migrants. There are three broad directions for those migrating from Ethiopia: the eastern route towards the Gulf, the southern route towards South Africa and the norther route towards Sudan, Libya and Europe. Many of the people moving along these different routes do so irregularly, without formal documentation and visas.

Anna: When considering these different routes, which is the most commonly used?

Kiya and Oliver: It is labour migration to the Gulf that is the largest of these, and the Ethiopian government has been particularly concerned about the situation of its citizens moving to find jobs in the Middle East, including many women taking on domestic work. Its approach has been to seek bilateral labour agreements with destination countries and to screen those hoping to ensure they have the right qualifications and training. This is accompanied by growing efforts to counter irregular migration, including human smuggling and trafficking, with measures to raise awareness, to train of border officials, prosecution of smugglers and traffickers and to support their victims.

Anna: Who are the main actors involved in migration management in Ethiopia?

Kiya and Oliver: The European Union has played an active role in supporting the Ethiopian government develop these policies. Ethiopia one of the largest recipients of funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. In particular, EU has funded the Better Migration Programme to support the development of a coherent national migration policy, build the capacity of officials to implement policy, improve protection of those subject to trafficking, and awareness-raising on the dangers of irregular migration. Other initiatives have invested on employment and livelihood opportunities to reduce incentives for those who might consider irregular migration.

Anna: The research across the project has demonstrated that there are some synergies and some divisions between local/national, regional, and international migration management – especially when considering the contexts of different international organisations (such as the EU) and their involvement. Do you have any findings from your research in Ethiopia that speak to this?

Kiya and Oliver: While the Ethiopian government and EU may have different interests in promoting these initiatives to ‘manage migration’, they share a common concern with reducing irregular migration. However, our research in Ethiopia has highlighted some important gaps between these policy priorities and the practices on the ground.

For many stakeholders, including local official, local communities and people on the move, it is not clear what counts as irregular migration. At Metema, on the border with Sudan, there had long been a practice of seasonal labour migration that involves thousands of Ethiopians crossing to work on commercial farms in Eastern Sudan. Some would not even describe this as migration; they reserve that term for dangerous journeys undertaken with the help of smugglers or other intermediaries. Even if it is recognised as migration, because there are such close social, cultural and economic links with Sudan, such border crossing is seen locally as a perfectly legitimate regardless of any formal requirements for papers.

Anna: And what are the on-the-ground implications of this?

Kiya and Oliver: This has important implications, when new initiatives aim to prevent irregular migration and enforce more border controls. While central government and international actors design programmes around sharply defined categories of legal/illegal or regular/irregular migration, their implementations come unstuck in the face of the complex and fluid understanding of these terms on the ground. Moreover, given the fundamental importance of cross border movement for the livelihoods of seasonal labour migrants, any disruption of the flow may have significant negative consequences for large numbers of people.

In the Horn of Africa, 2023 was characterised by numerous devastating extreme weather events, a trend that is expected to intensify in the coming years. The region continues to suffer from both rapid onset events such as floods and droughts and slow-onset climate change-related phenomena such as desertification. Although the countries of the region contribute only marginally to global greenhouse gas emissions, they bear the brunt of climate change-induced disasters that lead to the destruction of livelihoods and displacement from their homes. Research shows that climate-related disasters such as floods, droughts and desertification have a direct impact on the environment and livelihoods, forcing people in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to migrate. In line with this, recent evidence clearly shows that climate change is exacerbating extreme weather events and their impacts, especially in vulnerable regions such as Africa, and causing a large-scale displacement crisis. For example, temperature increases and droughts are important factors affecting agricultural production in African countries, with poorer countries experiencing more severe negative impacts. In addition, climate-related disasters can exacerbate ethnic tensions and increase the risk of armed conflict, especially in highly fragmented countries.

However, the countries that contribute significantly to global warming have engaged in migration policy discourses that are disconnected from the realities of poorer countries. As one expert, an advocate for grass-root engagement, noted: “The countries that contribute significantly to global warming and climate change are actively steering migration policy discussions. However, these discussions often overlook the fact that people in poorer countries bear the consequences and pay the price in order to maintain the lifestyles, industrialisation and economic growth in industrialised countries”.

Despite gradual progress in recognising the anthropogenic impacts of climate change and the emergence of initiatives such as Loss and Damage, which acknowledge the disproportionate impact of climate change on regions such as Africa, there remain significant gaps among international actors, including the EU, in explicitly identifying climate-induced disasters as a major cause of livelihood loss and displacement in affected regions (according to representatives from public institutions). Regardless of the positions of international actors from industrialised countries, African countries have taken a leading role in recognising the human contribution to climate change and its impact on migration. According to an interview with a representative from a German Development Cooperation, policy makers and regional policy organisations, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have acknowledged climate-induced displacement and the need to address its causes. As one expert from an intergovernmental organisation noted, “It is increasingly recognised that many countries on the African continent have taken concrete steps to acknowledge the contribution of human-induced factors to phenomena such as droughts, floods, desertification and other impacts of slow-onset climate events”.

As far as international actors are concerned, our empirical analysis revealed a prevailing tendency in documents and media reports on climate change and migration to portray climate-related disasters — such as droughts, floods and desertification — as natural phenomena that occur independently of human action. This view emphasises the unpredictability and inevitability of such events and absolves the EU and other industrialised countries of responsibility for the resulting migration from Africa. Interviewees pointed out that many actors, including governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), perceive extreme weather events as natural disasters. A participant from civil society in the Horn of Africa explained: “Most stakeholders, including governments and NGOs, tend to view droughts and floods in the region as natural disasters and do not recognise that they are man-made or caused by climate change. This view makes it difficult to consider sustainable solutions”. In this context, a civil society expert in the region stated that:

“I think that the number of people affected by droughts and other extreme weather events has increased, with the severity and frequency escalating due to the increasing impact of climate change. There are gaps when it comes to explicitly recognising the displacement of people and destruction of livelihoods due to climate change-induced disasters and attributing them to human-induced activities in industrialised countries”

An expert working for one of the United Nations organisations expressed a similar view: “To be honest, not everyone agrees that the frequent and intense extreme weather events in the Horn of Africa, such as droughts and floods, are a consequence of climate change caused by human activity. Many, especially international actors, still see these as natural phenomena”. This natural view in policy documents and media coverage constructs a narrative that portrays these disasters as beyond human control, thus minimising the EU’s perceived responsibility for addressing the underlying causes of climate migration.

Conclusions
By framing these disasters as natural rather than man-made events, powerful actors can strategically distance themselves from the consequences of their actions, thereby evading accountability and responsibility for climate-induced displacement. The narrative of naturalisation has several far-reaching implications for policy, international cooperation, ethical considerations and public perception.
The naturalisation of climate-related disasters has significant empirical and theoretical implications for understanding the mechanisms by which developed countries evade responsibility for climate-induced displacement. This view shifts responsibility away from the main perpetrators of climate change, creates ethical challenges in international cooperation and shifts responsibility to the most vulnerable regions. It also reinforces a disproportionate focus on humanitarian aid and influences public perceptions in a way that undermines support for systemic change. A shift towards recognising the anthropogenic roots of these disasters is essential to promote accountability, support equitable policies and ensure that responses to climate change are just and inclusive.

In this interview, Anna Gopsill asks Ida Marie Savio Vammen about her research on Senegal – reflecting on the interesting findings from the country and highlighting the importance of including Senegal in the project EFFEXT. The EFFEXT project examined the effects of externalisation of EU borders into Africa and the Middle East, the project included six countries: Senegal, Ghana, Libya, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Anna: What made Senegal an interesting case to include in this project?

Ida: Senegal is a compelling case when examining the influence of European externalization initiatives on African partner countries. For nearly two decades, the European Union and individual member states—particularly Spain, France, and more recently Germany—have in different ways attempted to curb irregular migration, both overland and especially at sea. The initiatives were set in motion by the so-called ‘Cayuco crisis’ in 2006, where over 30.000 migrants, predominantly from Senegal, reached the Spanish Canary Islands by boat and were later spurred by the European refugee crisis and renewed activity on the dangerous Atlantic sea route since late 2019.

Migration and remittances play a vital socioeconomic and cultural role in the country which has a long tradition of cross-border mobility, both within the region and internationally, linked to colonial times but also predating them. In conjunction with economic difficulties and youth employment, this fact makes it difficult for the heavily funded externalization initiatives to meet their objective which is recognized by most of the European and Senegalese policy actors I have talked to during fieldwork.  

Over the years, the Senegalese government has simultaneously accommodated and resisted EU pressures. They have had to navigate donor interest that comes with access to development funding and funding to build the national security apparatus with sensitive issues such as forced return, which remains politically sensitive nationally and their interest in strengthening diaspora contributions.

Anna: When considering migration governance in Senegal, who are the main actors involved?

EU interest and funding for migration and security-related projects and the influence of international organizations, especially the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have fostered institutional fragmentation and competition for migration-related resources for institutional capacity building and funding. At the governmental level, key actors include the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for the police, including border control, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter is represented by the Directorate General for the Diaspora (DGSE), which manages diaspora relations and programs such as the BAOS, and the Directorate General for Consular Affairs, responsible for issuing travel documents and participating in return and repatriation processes. Other governmental ministries are involved as well, such as the Directorate General for Employment, which negotiates labor agreements with third countries, and the Ministry of Justice, particularly in relation to anti-trafficking efforts.

When attempting to draft the country’s National Migration Policy (NMP), the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Cooperation and the Directorate General of Human Capital Development led a policy process from 2015-2018 (funded by the IOM) that ultimately failed. More recently, IOM has again played a significant funding role in the adoption of Senegal’s new NMP. In this case, the Ministry of Finance, pressured by the EU, played a decisive role in pushing for the policy’s finalization, spearheaded by former Prime Minister Amadou Ba’s office.

Anna: Are there any specific ongoing challenges in the country?

It remains uncertain how the new government under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko will address migration issues and if they will adopt this policy or pursue a different path in line with their agenda to enhance Senegal’s sovereignty and reduce foreign dependencies and debt.

Anna: While the project findings are still being crystallised, has any one finding emerged from your research in Senegal?

My research in Senegal highlights the multifaceted ripple effects of EU and European actors’ externalization initiatives and discourses, particularly how they influence civil society actors’ and activists’ engagement with migration issues and policies. Civil society organizations (CSOs) often become key intermediaries in the migration industry, implementing EU-funded projects as they struggle for financial support. At the same time, other CSOs seek to challenge and subvert the European border regime and the Eurocentric narratives around migration.

Anna: Finally, what have you found to be interesting when researching Senegal?

One of the most intriguing aspects has been the contestation from below of European externalization efforts. For instance, while the EU has heavily invested in campaigns aimed at deterring migration from Senegal, it has been interesting to follow activist-led campaigns in Dakar that have emerged to provide counternarratives, challenging Eurocentric migration policies and the associated border violence.

Moreover, observing the role of CSOs in the recent migration policy process has been fascinating. On one hand, they advocate for a migration policy that prioritizes Senegal’s interests over those of the EU. On the other hand, there appears to be a recurring cycle of “performative inclusion” of these actors in policy-making, leading their initial critical engagement to evolve into more reluctant compliance with the broader European migration agenda. It will, therefore, be interesting to see whether some of these CSOs’ critical perspectives will resonate more with the new government ideals and find ways to disrupt the dominant European migration agenda, which seems to continue to overshadow Senegal’s interests. Should the EU truly seek a more equitable partnership with Senegal, it is vital to include and seriously consider the perspectives of local actors and CSOs on mobility and migration.

In 2011, while conducting fieldwork for my master’s thesis in the South Wollo area of Ethiopia’s Amhara region, I came across a striking paradox that has continued to shape my research on migration governance. My focus was on understanding how rural Ethiopian households financed the journey to the Gulf countries, where the Kafala system – in which migrant workers are legally tied to their employers for entry, stay and return – governs labour migration It is a system where the responsibility for managing transnational labour recruitment is handed over to non-state actors, such as private citizens and recruitment agencies. This decentralized approach is based on sponsorship. While there have been efforts to reform the system recently, it remains highly restrictive and continues to enforce intersectional segregation.

To understand further the financial considerations for moving, I conducted a survey within which I asked “How do families pay for migration to the Gulf?” The answers were initially what I expected—selling livestock, savings from agriculture, or borrowing from family and friends. But as I delved deeper, an unexpected pattern began to emerge. Some respondents revealed that they had funded their migration using money from development programs like the Rural Productivity Safety Net Project and other cash transfer initiatives. These programs, funded by international donors, such as the European Union (EU), USAID, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the World Bank, were designed to stabilise rural economies and reduce migration pressures. They aimed to improve local livelihoods by boosting agricultural productivity and providing safety nets for vulnerable households. However, instead of curbing migration, these programs were indirectly enabling it. The funds intended to help families stay in their villages were being repurposed to pay brokers, recruitment agencies, and travel expenses for migration under the Kafala system in the Gulf.

Intrigued, I conducted follow-up focus group discussions. The participants explained how these development interventions had created financial capacity within households that allowed them to pursue migration. One respondent noted, “The cash transfer program helped us save enough to send my son to work in Saudi Arabia. Without it, we wouldn’t have been able to pay for the broker or his visa.” Another participant added that while they had initially used the funds to migrate to the Gulf, they were already planning to save for a future trip to Europe.

A Paradox of Migration Governance through Development Aid
This paradox highlights the unintended consequences of well-meaning development interventions. Programs, like the Rural Safety Net Project, were designed to address the root causes of migration by improving living standards and creating local opportunities. Yet, they inadvertently became tools for financing transnational labour migration. For many rural Ethiopian households, migration remains the most viable path to economic mobility despite the risks involved. This phenomenon underscores the complexity of migration governance in a globalised world, where policies and interventions often produce outcomes far removed from their original intentions. For example, while the EU has long invested in development aid to reduce irregular migration from Africa, the case of Ethiopia shows that this aid can also facilitate migration to regions with restrictive labour governance frameworks, like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Development Aid and the Kafala System
The Gulf’s Kafala system is notorious for its restrictive and exploitative practices. Under this system, migrant workers are tied to their employers, who have significant control over their legal status, mobility, and working conditions. Despite these challenges, the promise of better wages and employment opportunities drives thousands of Ethiopians, particularly women, to work as domestic workers in GCC countries every year. During my fieldwork in Ethiopia, I observed how development aid, primarily funded by Western institutions, inadvertently facilitated migration to the Gulf. The money from programs like the Rural Safety Net Project enabled families to cover the substantial costs associated with migration, including broker fees, visa applications, and airfare. In some cases, the funds were also used to repay loans taken out to finance earlier migration attempts. One woman I interviewed described how the safety net program transformed her family’s prospects: “We were able to send my daughter to Qatar to work as a housemaid. She sends money home every month, which has helped us build a new house and buy more land.” Her story illustrates the dual role of migration as both a survival strategy and a pathway to economic advancement for Ethiopian households.

From the Gulf to Europe: Migration as a Stepping Stone
Interestingly, some participants in my focus groups revealed that their ultimate goal was not to settle in the Gulf but to use it as a stepping stone for migration to Europe. For these migrants, the Gulf represented an intermediary destination where they could save money and gain the resources needed to pursue further migration. One young man explained, “My plan is to work in Saudi Arabia for a few years, save enough money, and then go to Europe through Libya.” This aspiration highlights the interconnectedness of global migration systems, where one region’s labour migration policies can influence migration flows to another. It also reveals the strategic agency of migrants, who navigate these systems to achieve their long-term goals.

Redirecting Migration Flows: A Latent Strategy?
The case of Ethiopia raises important questions about the role of external actors in shaping migration patterns. While the EU’s development aid aims to reduce migration pressures by improving local conditions, its focus on promoting “legal pathways for migration” has arguably diverted potential migrants to regions like the GCC, where the Kafala system governs labour migration. This dynamic reflects a latent strategy of migration redirection, where potential irregular migrants to Europe are encouraged—directly or indirectly—to pursue legal migration to the Gulf. In Ethiopia, the EU’s externalisation practices are evident in its support for capacity-building initiatives and migration management programs. These programs often prioritise the regulation of migration flows to destinations other than Europe, aligning with the EU’s broader goal of reducing irregular migration. However, this approach raises ethical questions about whether such policies genuinely serve the interests of migrants or primarily cater to the geopolitical priorities of receiving states.

A Broader Reflection
The intersection of development aid, migration governance, and labour migration under the Kafala system offers a compelling lens to examine the unintended consequences of external interventions. While programs like the Rural Safety Net Project are designed to stabilise communities and reduce migration pressures, they often end up facilitating the very migration they seek to prevent. This paradox underscores the need for more nuanced and holistic approaches to migration governance—approaches that consider the interconnectedness of global migration systems and the agency of migrants themselves. For policymakers, this means moving beyond narrowly defined objectives like curbing irregular migration to address the structural drivers of migration, including economic inequality and restrictive labour practices.
As the case of Ethiopia shows, migration is not merely a response to hardship, but a complex and strategic process shaped by a range of local and global factors. Understanding this complexity is crucial for designing policies that genuinely support the rights and aspirations of migrants while addressing the broader challenges of migration governance in an increasingly interconnected world. This narrative, rooted in my fieldwork, illustrates the intricate ways in which development aid and migration governance intersect, often in unexpected ways. It challenges us to rethink the assumptions underpinning external interventions and to consider how policies can be reimagined to create more equitable and sustainable outcomes for migrants and their communities.