The subjects and objects of relief: how local aid workers articulate and remake what it means to be humanitarian

This post is part of a series linked to the workshop “Assessing the Anthropology of Humanitarianism: Ethnography, Impact, Critique”.


“Allah will help the one who gives. If I have even one Birr [Ethiopian currency], I try to give it to him, the man in need. Most people do this. It is our culture. We share what we have. That is who we are. We are the same people, all of us, the same blood. And when you do this, the people will know. People would see if I was doing this work at [the relief NGO] professionally and not living it. What you are doing and saying in the community, it has to be what you are. If I am not practicing, they will know. … You should not go to a hotel, but you should sleep there with them, and then they will know you are serious.’ Mussa, a Somali man from Ethiopia who works for a European relief organization.

This essay introduces one part of my larger ethnographic project to investigate “humanitarianism” as it is enacted by local aid workers like Mussa in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. In this, I address the following questions: Who is a “humanitarian” — and therefore whose work is deemed vital and benevolent in emergencies? What counts as a “humanitarian” intervention, for aid workers as well as people in communities where crises recur? And finally, how do various forms of humanitarianism evident in the Somali Region differ from and also shape the legally recognized international humanitarian system, governed mostly be international law, wealthy donor governments, and multinational organizations?

“[H]umanitarianism is contingent,” Brada (2016: 756) argues, “it depends on circumstance and varies from one context to another.” Following Brada, I trace the contingencies, contexts, and the constant linguistic and programmatic maintenance of what is be deemed “humanitarian” (and what is misrecognized or ignored as such) within aid organizations, clinical spaces, and beneficiary communities in the Somali Region.

Numerous exposés and scholarly analyses critique the global humanitarian enterprise (e.g. Alexander 2015, Cain 2006, Curtis 2018, Fox 2013, Redfield 2013). But often, these perspectives myopically focus on (mostly white) expatriate aid workers. However, the vast majority of people responding to conflicts, disasters, and epidemics of disease around the world are not parachuting in from afar, but are themselves from crisis-affected communities (Fox 2013, James 2010).

They are locals and they are frequently also the so-called “beneficiaries” of aid; they are language translators, survey enumerators, refugee camp managers, and community health workers. They are manual laborers building latrines and clinics, and they are experts on and brokers of local power relations and cultures. They are the neighbors and relatives of people in crisis; they are certified nurses and physicians with steady streams of patients whether someone declared an emergency or not; and they are caregivers and volunteers who live in crisis-affected communities long before and after aid organizations intervene.

Within thinktanks, professional organizations, and relief agencies headquartered in Europe and North America, there is increasing attention to the needs of local staffers, and an increasing desire to “localize aid” and “devolve” power from donor and global aid institutions to organizations located in crisis-affected communities (Charter4change 2017, Gingerich & Owen 2017, ODI 2016, Mahmood 2017). Professional venues and publications frequently portray the local and national staffs of relief organizations as the heroes and the rightful focus of humanitarian response (e.g. Oxfam 2014, cf. Benton 2016).

Consequently, while emergency assistance does involve material distributions of resources, it also now entails an effort to develop the capacity of people in crisis-affected communities, and to transform individuals there from beneficiaries or “crisis-affected persons” into competent service providers and the leaders of humanitarian missions. Local aid workers like Mussa are therefore both the object and the subject of global humanitarianism. They are employed by aid agencies – often to perform the most difficult and dangerous jobs within the relief industry – and yet at the same time, their work is also a variant on what Feldman (2007) calls, “ethical labor:” it proves relief agencies’ righteous empowerment of locals and their innovative attention to local contexts.

I have spent the last eleven years engaged in ethnographic study of the lives of Somali aid workers, healthcare providers, policymakers, and beneficiaries in eastern Ethiopia, as well as the local economies and moralities produced through various and episodic forms of humanitarian and medical engagement there. Like so many other places around the world, political violence, forced migration, droughts, floods, and outbreaks of infectious diseases like cholera threaten lives and livelihoods every few months or years. Interventions happen reactively and sporadically, as the funding priorities of aid agencies ebb and flow. Like other places facing recurrent declarations of “humanitarian crisis,” employment with relief agencies represents the best gig in town, but these jobs are few and far between. Even the most dedicated workers lack for professional development and contracts beyond the horizon of the crisis at hand.

At the same time, the emic forms of humanitarianism local aid workers, healthcare providers, and humanitarian policymakers actualize through their engagement and employment with relief organizations are also part of broader efforts on their part to be, as Mussa phrased it, “the one who gives,” and to “share what we have.” As such, and to summarize points I will expand on in the upcoming workshop in Bergen, the driving and organizing forces of humanitarianism in the Somali Region include:

  • Islamic practice and ethics,
  • personal histories of receiving foreign humanitarian assistance,
  • responsibilities to care for family—broadly speaking, beyond blood-based kinship ties, to encompass neighbors and close friends,
  • communality, and a common practice of radically redistributing and sharing resources, especially within kinship groups and to elders and persons in greatest need,
  • hospitality—especially to those from afar.

These forces of humanitarian action shape both the implementation of relief operations by local aid workers, and the consideration and design of policies at higher levels of aid agencies. These forces are also explicitly and intentionally political, personal, and emotional – a stark contrast from articulations of “neutrality” and “impartiality” so fundamental to International Humanitarian Law and actions of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarianism in the Somali Region, I argue, may therefore be better understood as contingent on the morality and sociality of caregiving (Kleinman 2012) and “logics of care” (Mol 2008), more than the missions of relief organizations headquartered in London, Geneva, or even Addis Ababa.

Understanding the multivalent humanitarianisms at work within aid agencies undermines popular imaginaries of humanitarian action as something mostly carried out by expatriates on rescue missions, and highlights instead the dynamic, hybrid, and socially- and politically-embedded actions of people caring for each other where foreign interventions recur. Recognizing the contingency of humanitarian action does not merely provide contextual nuance; instead these perspectives are necessary to decolonize and reconceptualize humanitarian practice as we know it.

 

References

Alexander, Jessica. 2013. Chasing chaos: My decade in and out of humanitarian aid. Broadway Books.

Bennett, Christina, Matthew Foley, and Sara Pantuliano. 2016.    “Time to let go: Remaking humanitarian action for the modern era.” Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/publications/10381-time-let-go-remaking-humanitarian-action-modern-era

Benton, Adia. 2016. Risky business: race, nonequivalence and the humanitarian politics of life.” Visual Anthropology. 29(2): 187-203.

Brada, Betsey Behr. 2016. “The contingency of humanitarianism: moral authority in an African HIV clinic.” American Anthropologist. 118(4): 755-771.

Cain, Kenneth, Heidi Postlewait, and Andrew Thomson. 2006. Emergency sex (and other desperate measures): true stories from a war zone. Random House.

Charter4change, “Localisation of Humanitarian Aid: The Charter.” https://charter4change.org/

Curtis, Heather D. 2018. Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid. Harvard University Press, 2018.

Feldman, Ilana. 2007. “The Quaker way: Ethical labor and humanitarian relief.” American Ethnologist 34(4): 689-705.

Fox, Renée C. 2014. Doctors without borders: humanitarian quests, impossible dreams of Médecins Sans Frontières. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gingerich, Tara and Marc Owen. 2015 “Turning the humanitarian system on its head: saving lives and livelihoods by strengthening local capacity and shifting leadership to local actors.” Oxfam.

James, Erica Caple. 2010. Democratic insecurities: Violence, trauma, and intervention in Haiti. University of California Press.

Kleinman, Arthur. 2012. “Caregiving as moral experience.” The Lancet 380(9853): 1550-1551.

Malkki, Liisa H. 2015. The need to help: The domestic arts of international humanitarianism. Duke University Press.

Mahmood, Jemilah. 2017. “Opinion: Yes, the humanitarian sector really is going to localize.” https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-yes-the-humanitarian-sector-really-is-going-to-localize-90487.

Mol, Annemarie, Ingunn Moser, and Jeannette Pols, eds. 2015. Care in practice: On tinkering in clinics, homes and farms. Vol. 8. transcript Verlag.

Mol, Annemarie. 2008. The logic of care: Health and the problem of patient choice. Routledge.

Oxfam. 2014. “Local aid workers, heroes of World Humanitarian Day.” https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2014/08/local-aid-workers-heroes-world-humanitarian-day/

Redfield, Peter. 2013. Life in crisis: The ethical journey of doctors without borders. University of California Press.

 

The duty of care: ‘reconfiguring’ humanitarian workers through risk relations

This post is part of a series linked to the workshop “Assessing the Anthropology of Humanitarianism: Ethnography, Impact, Critique”.

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Introduction

 Humanitarian organizations are incrementally adopting sophisticated ‘risk management’ systems that cover not only security and safety, but also economic, legal, reputational and operational aspects. In protecting their staff from ‘risk’, organizations have shifted the focus of policy design from operational failure towards preventive risk control measures that simultaneously tame and create additional (unmanaged) uncertainties in form of risk (Power 2009).

Although ‘the duty of care’ is increasingly perceived as an important standard to achieve ‘safety’, this paper argues that in practice, the duty of care creates a tension between attaining the humanitarian [organizational] project and protecting the staff, constantly reconfiguring humanitarian workers from objects at risk (to be protected) into risk objects (posing a threat to the realization of the humanitarian project). I provide a reading of the contemporary HSE Norwegian legislation and the relational theory of risk to explore how ‘the duty of care’ is articulated around relations of risk (Boholm & Corvellec 2011).

 

“Keeping out of harms way”

The changing legal requirements for humanitarian NGOs in Norway realized a reading of employer-employee relationships termed “ the duty of care”. The notion of ‘the duty of care’ refers to an obligation manifested in two categories: moral and legal. The moral duty of care derives from the responsibilities that arise from the consecution of an organizational project. In Norway, the legal duty of care is often framed in the language of HSE-related regulations. It denotes the “obligation imposed on an individual or organization requiring that they adhere to a standard of reasonable care while performing acts (or omissions) that present a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others” (Kemp & Merkelbach 2011: 20).

In the context of humanitarian action, the notion of ‘the duty of care’ is translated in a binary structure of collective and individual responsibility, where the organization is obliged “to manage and address foreseable risks, which will be context-specific” to protect their staff and assets (Nobert & Williamson 2017: 2–3). Humanitarian workers are expected to individually ‘manage’ risk, not only identifying and controlling risks but also in ‘taking’ or ‘accepting’ certain risks (Kendra 2007: 32) considered ‘reasonable’ and ‘expected’ from humanitarian fieldwork activities.

 

Managing uncertainty

In quantitative terms, risk is usually conceptualized by a ‘set of triplets’ (Garrick & Christie 2008: 18) that combines probability and consequence (Kaplan & Garrick 1981; Garrick & Christie 2008: chap. 2). In this manner, risk is described as the statistical probability of an outcome in combination with the severity of its effect (cost) which is estimated in money, deaths or affectations to health (Boholm 2003: 160–61; Hansson 2010).

The distinction between uncertainty and risk can also be linked with a “dynamic of organizing to produce decidability and actionability”. Subsequently, uncertainties become risks when they are incorporated into management systems for identification, assessment and mitigation. Since the mid 1990s the division between uncertainty and risk is essentially an “institutional and managerial distinction between those events and issues that are expected to be treated within management systems as ‘risk’ and those which are not”. Uncertainty is converted into risk when it becomes a target to be managed. Accordingly, when uncertainty is organized, it converts into “‘risk’ to be managed”  (Power 2009: 5–7).

 

Only that which is valued can be at risk

Noticing that there was a scholarly gap in the examination of the conceptual structure of social definitions of risk, Hilgartner (1992: 40) claimed “definitions of particular risks include at least three conceptual elements, an object deemed to “pose” the risk, a putative harm, and a linkage alleging some form of causation between the object and the harm.” In assessing risk, the fundamental question is not ‘what is risk?’, but ‘how do people understand something as risk?’

This shifted the conceptualization of risk from a static variable (of hazard, institutional factors, interests, organizational structures) into risk as a dynamic feature of social relations (Boholm & Corvellec 2011: 176; Boholm 2003: 175).

An object can only be defined as risky in a two-step process: initially, through its construction as object in itself, and later through the establishment of a linkage between this object and a putative harm. This approach implies, first, that the notion of value is fundamental to any conceptualization of risk (Aven & Renn 2009: 1–2; Rosa 1998: 28; Sellke & Renn 2010: 297). Simply put, “for an object to be considered ‘at risk’, it must be ascribed some kind of value”. The second implication is that “value and relationships are culturally situated” (Boholm & Corvellec 2011: 177–78).

The fact that risk varies according to social structure, institutions and values (Douglas 1986) implies that conceptions of risk are ‘biased’ and embedded within values and beliefs. Risk is a dynamic relationship of value, composed of three conceptual elements: risk objects, referring to something that is considered dangerous; an object at risk, an entity endowed with worthiness; and a causal linkage or relationship of risk, provided by an observer. In this framework, value sits at the heart of defining or not something as risk because “different actors might identify risk differently depending on what exactly they value and why” (Boholm 2015: 163).

 

Humanitarian workers reconfigured: Scalability between ‘risk objects’ and ‘objects at risk’

The duty of care positions humanitarian workers in a problematic conceptual space in which lines of difference between “safe” and “unsafe” behaviour, as well as boundaries between insiders and outsiders and day-to-day actions of incorporation and exclusion (Harvey & Knox 2015: 118) are both fluid and reinforced. The concern for safety is often undermined by creating associations and dissociations between the humanitarian project and designated risk objects and objects at risk. By way of evaluating whether the project is ‘safe’ on a risk-by-risk basis, successful risk treatment is a process by which previous levels of ‘riskiness’ are downgraded by way of ‘controlling’ (Boholm 2015: 162; Corvellec & Boholm 2008: 635).

When humanitarian workers are selected as an ‘object at risk’, the responsibility for their protection in the form of the duty of care is collectivized, and the organization (HFR) ‘safeguards’ their well-being through adequate risk management. When humanitarian workers fail in their duty of care (through negligence or stipulated misconduct) there are reconfigured as ‘risk objects’. Through the duty of care, humanitarian workers are constantly oscillating from ‘risk’ to ‘safety’ and back again.

 

Bibliography

Aven, T. & O. Renn. 2009. On risk defined as an event where the outcome is uncertain Journal of Risk Research 12: 1–11.

Boholm, Å. 2003. The cultural nature of risk: Can there be an anthropology of uncertainty? Ethnos 68: 159–78.

— 2015. Anthropology and Risk. 1 edition. London ; New York: Routledge.

Boholm, Å. & H. Corvellec. 2011. A Relational Theory of Risk Journal of Risk Research 14: 175–90.

Corvellec, H. & Å. Boholm. 2008. The risk/no-risk rhetoric of environmental impact assessments (EIA): the case of offshore wind farms in Sweden Local Environment 13: 627–40.

Douglas, M. 1986. Risk Acceptability According to the Social Sciences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Garrick, B.J. & R.F. Christie. 2008. Quantifying and Controlling Catastrophic Risks. Academic Press.

Hansson, S.O. 2010. Risk: objective or subjective, facts or values Journal of Risk Research 13: 231–38.

Harvey, P. & H. Knox. 2015. Roads: An Anthropology of Infrastructure and Expertise. 1 edition. Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press.

Hilgartner, S. 1992. The Social Construction of Risk objects: Or, How to Pry Open Networks of Risk, in L. Clarke & J. Short (ed.) Organizations, Uncertainties, And Risk, 1 edition: 39–53. Boulder: Routledge.

Kaplan, S. & B.J. Garrick. 1981. On The Quantitative Definition of Risk Risk Analysis 1: 11–27.

Kemp, E. & M. Merkelbach. 2011. Can you get sued?  Legal liability of international humanitarian aid organisations  towards their staff. Geneva: Security Management Initiative.

Kendra, J. 2007. The Reconstitution of Risk Objects Journal of Risk Research 10: 29–48.

Nobert, M. & C. Williamson. 2017. Duty of Care: Protection of Humanitarian Aid Workers from Sexual Violence. Report the Abuse.

Power, M. 2009. Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management. 1 edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosa, E.A. 1998. Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk Journal of Risk Research 1: 15–44.

Sellke, P. & O. Renn. 2010. Risk, Society and Environmental Policy: Risk Governance in a Complex World, in M. Groß & H. Heinrichs (ed.) Environmental Sociology: European Perspectives and Interdisciplinary Challenges: 295–321. Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer.

 

Political visions of a humanitarian aid group in Karen (Kayin) state, Myanmar

This post is part of a series linked to the workshop “Assessing the Anthropology of Humanitarianism: Ethnography, Impact, Critique”.

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Religion is a privileged site through which to study how to make loss more bearable and re-constructed lives more comfortable (Johnson and Werbner 2010). Religion is intimately linked to involuntary mobility: it assists in crossing boundaries and is part of a process of reconstructing the self and re-imagining the community (Tweed 2006). In looking at religion not only as a tool of existential struggle, but also as a vehicle of meaning making, border crossing, and the kinetics of homemaking, we can understand religion as a political project and political aspiration in transnational context and space (Horstmann and Jung 2015: 1-21). In this post, I highlight the way that displacement and human suffering in Southeastern Myanmar is used for a missionary calling within a faith-based humanitarian service group.

 

The Free Burma Rangers

My case study introduces you to the humanitarian service group “Free Burma Rangers” (hereafter FBR) that provides emergency health and counseling services to the internally displaced in the protracted civil wars in Burma (Myanmar). The FBR was founded by David Eubank, son of veteran missionary Alan Eubank. David used to be a special envoy with the US army, and has been stationed with the Wa people. After seeing the suffering of the Karen people from the military assault imposed upon them by the Burmese military regime, and driven by his Christian mission, he decided to combine all elements in his career – humanitarian, missionary and military – to ally with senior Karen from the armed wing of the political organization of the Karen – to help wounded Karen villagers with emergency healthcare. Therefore, he trained Karen nurses in medical service with financial support coming from private donations. Teams of the FBR were established in all frontier regions of Myanmar, saving hundreds of lives, also documenting human rights abuses.

The commitment to help the wounded places the FBR in line with the better known Médecins Sans Frontières (MFS), or Doctors without Borders. But while the well-known Doctors without Borders’ principle is secular human rights, the Rangers perceive themselves in a sacred struggle of good against evil. While MSF aims at remaining impartial, the Rangers take sides with the ethnic minorities residing in the Southeast Asian massif and walk with the ethnic armies. MSF took their origin from a leftist and secular critique of capitalism; American Protestant Christianity drives the FBR. MSF only uses medicine and scalpels, the Rangers are armed (they normally avoid contact with the Burmese army, they are willing to stand ground with the displaced villagers and to defend them if necessary).

The doctors of the FBR do not cling to the old religion of Karen Baptism in the homeland, but model their new faith by membership in an American humanitarian organization (the FBR) and along the lines of American Christianity, an organization that crosses into Myanmar from neighboring countries and supplies the Karen freedom fighters with nurses. Further, while new scholarship highlights the presence of reverse missionization from the South in the North, we have a complex case of American missionaries working hand-in hand with Karen missionaries spreading the gospel and lending a hand to the wounded Kurds in Iraq and Nuba people in South Sudan. Not only in epistemic ways, they follow the colonial pattern of the Karen converting to American Baptism and allying with the British, but the resettled and outbound Karen also transfer specific traditions of Karen missionization to other conflict-ridden areas around the globe.

Humanitarian organizations such as FBR establish alternative networks and actors who monitor the world for human rights violations, making public important evidence of atrocities and bringing them to the attention of the media. They want more than just to provide medical help; they want to give back dignity and provide a bit of normality in a context of permanent crisis. The FBR crucially not only provide medical assistance, but also solidarity with the refugees.

 

The narrative of heroism: David Eubank and the FBR

The narrative of heroism is highlighted in the staged performance of dramatic images on video clips circulated among American and global church congregations.

The family is at the center of Christian discourse on moral values. David is in no way a lone adventurer as he stands for an imagined global family of Christians. David’s family is center stage in all of the Rangers’ cinematic presentations. His wife, Karen, his two teenage daughters and his small son are all actively involved in the Rangers’ activities and are outspoken actors and humanitarians in their own right. David’s wife is a teacher. She and her Karen team, besides being on David’s side in the war-zone, provide the displaced and traumatized villagers with entertainment through the “Good Life Club” which aims to encourage the villagers through making handicrafts, playing children’s games, singing songs and learning Bible stories. The “Good Life Club” is about proselytizing in a playful way. Young people all over America prepare Christmas gifts, clothes, woolen caps and other useful things for the villagers in need. David’s wife, Karen, and her team members lead encouraging prayers. One of the main principles of the Rangers is that displaced villagers should feel that there is someone to assist them in times of desperation.

FBR’s promotional clip used in public relations to spread the news about FBR’s heroic struggle in Myanmar shows David’s teenage daughter riding a white horse, making its way confidently through the deep jungle. The white horse exemplifies both the purity of the mission, its noble task and the family’s total dedication to the cause. David’s daughter riding visually symbolizes the possibility of running away from the danger zone.

The devotional experience of servicing the FBR propels a specific personal trajectory in the mind of their staff and places them into a global humanitarian field. Of course, it also places them into a global religious field. In this sense, humanitarian assistance becomes, in Csordas’ words (Csordas 2009), a portable religious practice that in dramatic fashion enlarges the radius of the participating while taking them hostage in a sort of crusade that brought the Rangers into great danger. Indeed, some Rangers lost their lives in action.

The key religious expression is prayer. The prayer is geared to action and personalized to the Rangers. The Rangers are part of a prayer group that offers “prayers for Burma” by appointment in Myanmar, Thailand, the USA and many other places in the world. David begins every interview with a prayer, emphasizing that Jesus has sent him. In a trailer for the FBR, he asks God why he has been sent to this journey and why there is so much suffering in the world. The prayer is best understood as a ritual in which suffering is symbolically expressed as a moral outrage that requires action. By imposing his prayer on all faith communities in Myanmar, he represents himself as a leader who knows the way out of tyranny and to the light.

I see David’s concern – “What I am doing here?” – as a springboard to explore how the Rangers use medical, military and missionary rhetoric to legitimize their intervention in a space of warfare and crisis. To be sure, the Rangers are in a powerful position in their relationship with vulnerable displaced Karen villagers, especially if compared to earlier campaigns of missionization by American Baptists, campaigns of missionization among the Montagnards of the Vietnamese Central Highlands, among the Hmong of Northern Laos, and among North Korean defectors in the Chinese borderland with North Korea (Jung 2015).

The FBR represent an important case study to unpack the notions of humanity and humanitarianism, and to highlight the ideology of war against evil that is used not only by Eubank, but by evangelical Christianity worldwide. Amidst this for humanity and justice rests the drastically expanded mobility of the Karen people involved in local and global humanitarian operations, as well as in new religious predicaments (Horstmann 2017).

 

Concluding Remarks

The humanitarian and political intervention of the FBR makes them a political force directly involved with the violence in Myanmar. While donations enable the FBR to purchase equipment, medical supplies and to recruit personnel, ordinary Karen villagers hardly have a voice in the Rangers’ media representations, appearing only as passive and happy recipients of the Rangers’ generosity. The transition from a victim of the atrocity to a Ranger and nurse is introduced as a natural pathway by the FBR. It is a conversion process in a double sense. The young women and men participating in a mission give themselves to Jesus (making a transition from Animism) and to the Rangers (making a transition from the jungle village). Conversion can thus be understood in multiple senses, not only conversion to a religion, but also to a lifestyle or to an identity. In this sense, the Rangers may well be one opportunity for young Karen peoples to find a home, belonging, the spirit of teamwork and potentially, martyrdom and sacrifice. These young and displaced Karen convert to the imagined community of a global Christian community, firmly based in the imagination of the American and Christian political thought that has identified the Karen as worthy of spiritual support. The FBR are expanding, identifying new enemies and new vulnerable groups that seek their military and medical assistance. As part of the Rangers, young women and men also join a political project and missionary adventure and thereby develop a new self, a new way of seeing the world and acting on its future.

 

References

Csordas, Thomas J. (ed.) (2009). Transnational Transcendence. Essays on Religion and Globalization. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horstmann, A., & Jung, J-H. (Eds.) (2015). Building Noah’s Ark for Refugees, Migrants and Religious Communities. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. (Contemporary Anthropology of Religion).

Johnson, Mark and Pnina Werbner (eds.) 2010. Diasporic Encounters, Sacred Journeys: Ritual, Normativity and the Religious Imagination among International Asian Migrant Women, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 3-4

Tweed, Thomas (2006). Crossing and Dwelling. A Theory of Religion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

Navigating the blurred boundaries of aid. On the pitfalls of post-humanitarian encounters

This post is part of a series linked to the workshop “Assessing the Anthropology of Humanitarianism: Ethnography, Impact, Critique”.

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The critique of humanitarian aid is not a prerogative of academic scholars. Aid workers know too well the limitations, risks and threats of large-scale aid work; they have questioned in detail the efficiency and legitimacy of formalized structures, the fiction of political neutrality, the competition between agencies, the lie of nonbusiness, and the production of differences and dependencies. Recent allegations of corruption, financing of the arms trade and even sex abuse have shown again how messy and imperfect the aid world can be. Humanitarian interventionism today seems to be at a breaking point. Against the backdrop of this critique and a still persisting perception of “crisis,” we observe the emergence of a new type of “aid culture”: Grassroots initiatives, faith-based encounters, activists’ movements – all generally non-formalized actors, many of which appear in an ad hoc manner in an attempt to respond to a lack of state presence in moments of emergency. These initiatives want to face the problems they still see and make a difference by striving towards a non-bureaucratic, nonprofit, non-hierarchical way of solidary, humane forms of social interaction.

In an attempt to offer some food for critical thinking for understanding the particularities of “vernacular humanitarianism” (Brkovic 2017), “solidarity humanitarianism” (Rozakou 2017) and the ‘neoliberal borderlands’ of help (Besteman 2016), I will use this blog to explore the pitfalls of encounters in a social setting in which helpers try to move beyond the logics, terms and temporalities of large-scale, formalized versions of humanitarian aid, and the recipients of help navigate a support structure that is both informalized and hyper-diversified. I will trace the trajectory of Rosemonde, a woman originally from Haiti, who I met while carrying out anthropological fieldwork on migratory trajectories in São Paulo, Brazil, and combine short interview samples with ethnographic impressions from the field.

When does a crisis end?

“We heard we could go to Brazil while we stayed in Santo Domingo [Dominican Republic]. Préval and Lula, they were friends. They said it on the radio; they would receive us here. We took a plane to Ecuador, then we came by bus. On the border we did some paper work with the polícia federal, but this was simple.”

Rosemonde reached the city in 2012, several months after a devastating earthquake had hit the town in which she lived. Many Haitians repeat the narrative of apolitical friendship between René Préval (former president of the Haitian Republic) and Luiz Lula da Silva President of Brazil at the time, which depicts Brazil as a caring friend in a context of a severe national crisis. Due to the special circumstances of Haitian migration, which was caused by environmental, not political reasons, Haitians would not have been eligible to asylum in Brazil. At the same time, however, Brazil was the leading partner in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti and, therefore, there was a general acceptance that Haitian migrants should not be returned to their country of origin. Given the need to regularize the stay of these large numbers of recent arrivals, the National Immigration Council created a special ‘humanitarian visa’ for this exceptional case, which grants Haitians permanent residency along with the documentation of their first entry (Moulin and Thomaz 2016). After a first phase of Haitian migration to Brazil, during which Haitian men found temporary employment in São Paulo’s construction industry relatively easily, Haitian women took the same route – some following their male partners, kin or friends, others travelling on their own. Rosemonde was one of them. She stayed at the casa migrante, a public shelter organized by the Missão Paz, a Catholic mission, during the first two months after her arrival in São Paulo. Many migrants receive bureaucratic and legal support here after their arrival, and also continue to refer here later to access certain social services.

Rosemonde and I first met in the huge yard in front of this church. Together with perhaps a hundred other immigrants, she queued to get access to the recrutamento, job interviews with Brazilian companies that were coordinated by the mission. While I talked to Rosemonde, she proudly presented her carteira de trabalho, her work permit, which she had received due to her regularized stay. “I am not a refugee. We [Haitians] are immigrants. We are allowed to stay here and work. I just have to find something today,” she said with a smile. Although she had already failed several times at the recrutamento, Rosemonde was still optimistic, because Susana, one of the Brazilian volunteers who accompany the job recruitment at the mission, had told her that she would have a good chance because she was Haitian. Susana had explained to me on a different occasion: “Since the earthquake, many Brazilian families want to employ a Haitian girl in their houses as a baba [housekeeper]. They have seen this terrible news on the television; they want to help. Haitians are known to be, let’s say, gentle and reliable.”

On the day we met, the job of an empregada domestica, a housekeeper, was offered in Itaim Bibi, a very luxurious and well-securitized neighborhood in west São Paulo. While carrying out the interviews, Marta, a blond and very well dressed relatively young Brazilian employer, was absolutely fixed on recruiting a woman from Haiti. In an interview with her after the recruitment procedure, she told me:

“I definitely want a girl [menina] from Haiti. I know several Haitians who work in our neighborhood; these are very good people. I perceive this as a good occasion for offering some help after this horrible earthquake. There is not much we can do, but provide a job, this is something, yes? They often support big families at home. Haiti is a country that has always captured my interest. Fascinating! And these people [povo], they are so proud. I am sure, they don’t steal, they are not troublemakers. They don’t party once you have left the house … [laughs]. You can rely on them. They are very good workers, simple people, you see? Everybody says so. And they can talk French to our kids.” [Interview carried out in Portuguese]

Marta obviously pictured a cultural particularity attached to a stereotypical imagination of Rosemonde’s country of origin. During my fieldwork in Brazil, I often witnessed representations of Haiti, and Haitian migrants, that were apparently linked to a clichéd perception of the contemporary Haitian condition as being shaped by extreme poverty and vulnerability. Haitians are often portrayed as “simple” and “honest” peasants, who incorporate a culturally engrained “modest integrity.” At the same time, many Brazilians sympathize with Haiti’s legacy as a post-slavery nation. According to this understanding, Brazil, an “emerging donor,” should demonstrate its humanitarian attitude especially towards Haiti, the first free Black nation in the world. And Marta, the potential employer, rides this wave of caring power.

When I accompanied Rosemonde during her job interview with Marta, however, I realized that she probably did not fulfill the employer’s expectations. Dressed in a tight black skirt and a shiny red blouse, she answered the employer’s questions in a rather strict manner, without hesitation, in a clearly articulated Portuguese and she also raised her own expectations regarding her working conditions. In the end, a younger Congolese woman got the job. Later, when Rosemonde stood together with me and some other women who shared their disappointment, Susana, the Brazilian volunteer joined us and tried to comfort them. “Maybe you are too self-confident [auto-confiante],” she said to Rosemonde with a wink. “My friend [amiga]! Try not to say too much the next time. Play the victim, not the rebel!” Although the women laughed, I had the impression that they clearly felt the paradoxes of a Haitian labelling that served both the image of the deserving victim and the independent and somehow scary stranger.

A week later, when Rosemonde and I met again in front of the Mission, she talked at length about her growing financial problems, her debts to her friends and her frustration. In these days, she thought constantly about returning to Haiti and how to purchase the flight ticket.

“I have saved $ 100, but it’s not enough. […] It’s so strange here in Brazil, everybody wants to help, they are kind, they approach you, they tell you this and that. But then, sometimes they say I am not a refugiado verdadeiro [true refugee]. That’s what they say. They prefer helping people like Burundians, Congolese or people from Afghanistan. Somehow, Haitians don’t correspond. I’m fed up with this confusion.”

Conclusion: what comes after humanitarian interventionism?

On a structural level, Rosemonde’s encounters did not take place in settings of humanitarian assistance. The different individuals and institutions she got in touch with addressed her on different grounds, and the encounters were removed in time and place from the original humanitarian crisis, the earthquake that happened five years previously. However, even after all these years, Rosemonde was continuously classified along moral categories which divide the landscape of potential aid beneficiaries into powerful binaries, such as refugee-immigrant, victim-rebel, and true and false. Susana, the volunteer, and Marta, the potential employer, are only two actors belonging to the large field of post-humanitarian aid that shapes the perception of mobile populations, who live in the city with different needs and expectations.

The notion of post-humanitarianism, I argue, captures not only the a posteriori of a given ‘emergency’ in spatial or institutional settings that follow a given crisis situation. Rather, multiple individuals, initiatives and even organizations intend to move beyond or out of the ‘aid box,’ while they simultaneously orient their actions towards a moral grammar that has previously been produced in humanitarian settings. In the case illuminated here, categories and hierarchies of need are filled with national, racialized and gendered stereotypes and the ‘deserving’ recipient of aid is distinguished from other others who are classified as potentially uncomfortable or dangerous.

References

Besteman, Catherine (2016) Making Refuge. Somali Bantu Refugees and Lewinston, Maine. Durham, London: Duke UP.

Brkovic, Carna (2017) Introduction: Vernacular #Humanitarianisms. Thematic thread at Allegra.lab, online since September 25, 2017. http://allegralaboratory.net/vernacular-humanitarianisms/

Rozakou, Katerina (2017): Solidarity #humanitarianism: The blurred boundaries of humanitarianism in Greece, online since September 27, 2017. http://allegralaboratory.net/solidarity-humanitarianism/

Carolina Moulin & Diana Thomaz (2016) The tactical politics of ‘humanitarian’ immigration: negotiating stasis, enacting mobility. Citizenship Studies, 20 (5): 595-609.

 

An essay on the anthropology of humanitarian shame

This post is part of a series linked to the workshop “Assessing the Anthropology of Humanitarianism: Ethnography, Impact, Critique”.

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Humanitarian pluralism

What are the cultural and historical forces and the physical dynamics that shape contemporary human displacements in the Middle East and the humanitarian efforts that follow?

In this essay, I want to focus on those providing aid, and specifically on the members of the ad-hoc, loosely organized group Refugees Welcome to the Arctic (RWTA) who are ordinary people seeking to right, in whatever small way they can, what Stephen O’Brien (UN Emergency Relief Coordinator) has coined “the humanitarian shame upon us all.” I am most interested not in exploring the effects and scale of these relief interventions—the everyday humanitarianism—or their unintended consequences, but rather in looking at these efforts from the perspective of the grassroots providers in Norway, far from the locus of the disaster.

I propose that as scholars of the human condition we can use our ethnographic approach, attentive to local voices and grounded interpretations, to closely follow the refugees along the different routes they take—from the camps and detention barracks, to points of transit, and then further. Following them as far as we can to investigate what the refugee crisis reveals about what I call ‘humanitarian pluralism’, a term that illuminates the spaces/places/distances and ambivalences that surround humanitarian situations and actions.

Humanitarian nurturance

Sometimes flashes from previous, long ago fieldwork revisit us and hone our thinking in unlikely places. For me, that flash from long ago took me back to the genocide survivors in the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem who I interviewed almost two decades ago. I was revisiting their memories of being fed and cared for when in February 2016 I arrived at one of the hotspots of the refugee “crisis”: the Arctic crossing between Russia and Norway.

Syrian refugees entering Norway above the Arctic Circle, through the border town of Kirkenes, are fleeing war, but they bring with them deep memories of moments of contentment, of times filled with family, delicious meals, and sociable neighborhoods. Geographically remote and climatically harsh as it may be, this part of Norway has a long history, and its people have deep memories of another time, in this case, of World War II, of homes burning, of starvation and cold. This is a place where recollecting history matters. When World War II broke out, Kirkenes was a community drawing its livelihood from the iron ore in the surrounding mountains. During the war, it became an important military garrison for the German army and was a staging area for the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. In October 1944, the Red Army crossed the border and pushed the Germans out of Kirkenes, thus the people of Kirkenes consider the Soviets their liberators. As the Germans retreated, they used scorched earth tactics and burned Kirkenes to the ground.

And so it is that humanitarian practices in Arctic Norway are refined not only in response to the immediate social contexts and circumstances—refugees arriving in Kirkenes in the fall and winter of 2015-16—but also by traumatic historic moments. I use the term “humanitarianism” both literally—as the process through which aid is proffered—and as a practice through which to think about compassion. My argument about how a disaster happening in one part of the world changes lives somewhere on the other side of the globe references what I think is captured in the phrase humanitarian encounter (Nefissa Naguib, “Middle East Encounters 69 Degrees North Latitude: Syrian Refugees and Everyday Humanitarianism in the Arctic.” In International Journal of Middle East Studies 49/4 (2017), 645-60). Humanitarian encounter is a trope I developed to suggest both the geographical voyages of humanitarian disasters—the great distances, the abrupt juxtaposition of cultures and histories, and the many trails of relief—and the very concrete nature of encounters between the recipients of aid and the providers who are caught up in the super-charged terrains of emergencies.

RWTA tactics have a particular resonance in this context, and the focus of its activities—its demands that refugees are fed well and often—have brought issues of global humanitarian solidarity to the forefront. Food is conceived of broadly, not as simply providing necessary calories, but as an essential element in creating living and resting spaces that make other humanitarian activities possible. Members of the RWTA saw in food an experiment in new, collective forms of commitment to global issues. This was one of the defining features of RWTA—it was both a solidarity association and a laboratory for alternative humanitarian forms. Part of the humanitarian experiment was determining how to keep refugees reasonably clothed, fed, and cared for so far away from their homes.

Food, and the way in which it became a core issue for RWTA, is a medium for communicating an alternate vision, both for food humanitarian action and for refugee regulations—an approach based on solidarity. A regular volunteer reflected that, “I feel this is like throwing one Christmas dinner party after another.” Another noted, “We are like mums and dads preparing food for a sports event. You never know how many will turn up or what the score will be.”

In humanitarian thinking, food tells us something about human struggles and vulnerability. As a core issue of humanitarian relief, we see that food makes and unmakes humanity. Food, as an object, and eating, as an act, resonate with attitudes and emotions relating to human understanding of and feelings about self and others and their underlying interactions. Emmanuel Levinas speaks about passivity in our encounters with other people’s sufferings and offers affinity as an alternative.

By contrasting, as Levinas does, the choice of providing with not providing, he can guide contemporary humanitarian research on questions of responsibility, obligation, and social integrity. He encourages us to pay attention to the face-to-face encounter, since it is in the face-to-face that the face of despair becomes transformative. Central to almost all of Levinas’s works is the concept of nourishment, in one form or another. Nourishment is an eminently personal affair: it gives us a sense of who we are in the world, and providing nourishment for others is a specificity of human responsibility and repair (Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2003)).

Conclusion

I like to think that this Arctic experience—in all its bizarre juxtapositions of disquiet and tranquility, of people from “down there” and those “at the top of the map” as a Syrian mother of two put it, of food and want—has created a new and rich archive of memory, sorrow, and optimism. It gives us the opportunity to develop scholarship on what Sherry Ortner terms the “anthropology of morality and ethics” (Sherry Ortner, “Dark Anthropology and Its Others: Theory since the Eighties,” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 6 (2016): 47–73. 59) and, as I witnessed the efforts by RWTA, this extends into an “anthropology of compassion.” Surely, the limits of compassion cut to the heart of our research and the politics of it all – “the humanitarian shame upon us all” – every time we read about how many die on their way to a safe harbor, and when individuals are met by high fences, armed police, and terrifying guard dogs. Our engagement as anthropologists is with the world and the human condition, and some of us are engaged in urgent research — with a “reasonable optimism”—tempered, certainly, with a certain realistic pessimism—but nevertheless based on a belief in the unquenchable human appetite for attachment to the world, imperfect and sometimes horrifying as it is.

 

Acknowledgments: Quotes from RWTA volunteers were recorded during research carried out in Kirkenes in the fall and winter of 2015 and into 2016. Research included participant observation and interviews, as well as informal encounters. I am immensely grateful to my interlocutors for the explanations and the thoughtful conversations to which I have been privy.

Suggested by Public Anthropologist – Nightmarch

The new book “suggested by Public Anthropologist” is Nightmarch. Among India’s Revolutionary Guerrillas by Alpa Shah.

In this vibrant piece of anthropological work, Shah takes us into one of the most unreported rebellions in contemporary India with wisdom and courage. Her analysis of the motivations, modalities of implementation and failures of Naxalites’ struggle shapes a new history of both the exploitation they suffered and their fight for liberation.

Written in a way that provides food for thought and, at the same time, moves hearts, this book is an example of the unique contribution anthropologists can bring to understanding the world we live in, and improving it.

Border walls and fences: an interview with Antonio De Lauri

There seems to be a current international preoccupation with border walls as a form of security and protection – with people both advocating and protesting their construction. However, walls and barriers are not a new phenomenon. What is the continuing historical factor motivating the construction of border barriers?

Throughout global history border barriers have had at least four main functions: to manifest political power (be it imperial or state power); to seize lands; to protect a territorial domain, a population or a group; and to create categories of people on the basis of whether a person was located on “this side” or on the “other side” of the wall (“civilized-uncivilized”, “citizens-barbarians”, “legal-illegal migrants”, etc.).

In their declared political intentions and purposes, walls are the factual, material response to the quest for collective protection in situations that are perceived as destabilized and at risk. Through a chemical metaphor, we could argue that the wall is the solidification of the liquid idea of protection, which ranges from geopolitics to biopolitics. Indeed, spatial and territorial control is not the only task ascribed to border barriers, since they also prove functional to disciplining populations and to the application of biopolitical governance in the everyday lives of citizens.  The wall is thus a technique of power aimed at governing borders that are differently performed  by a plurality of social actors.

Are contemporary walls and fences a consequence of globalization and increased population movement, or rather a reaction to it?

In terms of contrasting criminal organizations, studies have shown that barriers do not affect illegal trafficking. Rather, there is an ambiguous relationship between illicit flows and the business of bordering. In fact, I don’t see walls as reactions to globalization. They are artifacts rooted in ancient times today fully integrated into a globalized world in which the affirmation of a privileged few who live the promise of globalization and free movement is defended through the erection of barriers to obstacolate the mobility of unpriviledged masses.

In a previous piece on the politics of fencing in the contemporary world, you wrote that the wall plays a role “as an agent of identification and exclusion”. Can you explain what you meant by this?

Walls and fences have a deep impact on people’s ordinary lives. The politics of protection can take different forms. In the 18th century, for example, after several cities in France were devasted by the plague coming from the Levant, the regial adminstration issued the construction of anti-plague walls and the closure of existing town walls. In South Africa, barriers were a crucial element of the apartheid segregation architecture. The fence along the border between Hungary and Serbia today responds to the current European propaganda in preventing refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan from trespassing Hungarian national borders and therefore represents a specific politics of citizenship in today’s Europe. In all its different forms, the physical barrier is not merely something that produces alterity and otherness (what remains outside of the wall), but it is also an instrument of governance, control and identification for what remains on “this side” of the wall.

The Berlin Wall has been a symbol of separation for decades. However, as you previously mentioned walls can be seen to symbolise separation, but also belonging and protection. Would you argue that today’s perception of walls and fences is perhaps more multifaceted in the West?

After the fall of the Berlin wall, efforts have been made in order to create a stable, peaceful European territory, which was built on the ashes of WWII. However, Europe is currently being walled up. Recent events like the financial crisis, the revivification of populist political and social movements, the humanitarian emergencies in the Middle East and the “refugee crisis”, resuscitated the use of walls and fences as securitarian devices in the political discourse of several European leaders. In today’s Europe, walls and fences respond to different political purposes. For instance, the Bulgaria-Turkey, Hungary-Serbia or the Norway-Russia barriers are representative of nation-states’ reaction to the current European migration crisis. The Ukraine-Russia example, on the other hand, responds to a quest for security and territorial control in a framework of nation-state tensions.

In your article Times of Walls you mention the historical example of Dannevirke as a a barrier that “shaped and limited territorial identity.” Dannevirke seems to have been used as an arena to shape and construct a historical narrative and identity over a long period of time, and by different groups. Can you briefly explain the relevance of this example?

An interesting reference here is the book “Murs. Une autre histoire des hommes” published by the French historian Claude Quétel. King Godfrid launched the construction of a series of fortifications in 808 in the Jutland peninsula, in today’s German Schleswig (Danish until 1864). This fortification was dug out by archeologists in the 1970’s and can be compared to the Offa’s Dyke in Wales. The Dannevirke ca be seen as a later manifestation and a reversed Roman limes. Danish tribes confederated in the VIII century, three centuries after the end of the Roman empire, and felt the urgency of defending their territory from the expansionist plans of the Francs. Danish articles titled: “Vikings’ entry door found!” because this defensive palisade included a door (next to Haithabu-Hedeby), a sign that commercial relations with the Francs were never interrupted. The Dannevirke was at the same time a proto-frontier and a bastion (like the Roman limes before). It shaped and limited Danish identity and territory, and acquired a growing importance in Danemark nationalist discourse: during the 19th century, with the second Schleswig war approaching, some Danish newspapers were renamed Dannevirke. Paradoxically, however, after being defeated in Dybbol, Danes lost Schleswig and their precious Dannevirke. During WWII, Germans feared an invasion of Jutland after the Normandy landings. A high-ranking Nazi official proposed to rebuilt the Dannevirke into a trench (turning it upside down). The archeological massacre was about to happen, when the Danish archeologist Soren Telling addressed Himmler resorting to an alleged shared Arian identity: such a symbol could therefore not be destroyed. Himmler interrupted the construction of trenches along the Dannevirke.

Finally, walls have been used historically to divide populations or protect a territory. In your opinion, are walls effective?

As an extension of nation-state ideologies and practices, walls have today a strong theatrical connotation. Despite the knowledge that the power of walls is limited by modern technology and the interdependencies of a global economy, the wall functions as a theatrical performance of state power and sovereignty in the face of a potential external national threat. Indeed, whether a border wall or fence is useful or not, its spectacle can (must) be seen by everybody. One of its main function, therefore, remains the power of creating categories of people. At the same time, however, the materiality of walls and its policing corollary have a deep impact on migrants and refugees mobility. Border barriers aggravate displacement and exacerbate the feelings of fear and insecurity perceived by both local populations and borders crossers.

 

‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ assistance provision beyond the grand narratives: Views from Lebanese and Syrian providers in Lebanon

Over the past few decades, scholars have increasingly employed the categories of ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ to explore different political geographies and economies in development cooperation and humanitarian aid provision. Without doubt, whether and how these denominations make sense are not merely dilemmas of terminology. The Global South has been historically referred to in a number of ways: as the ‘Third World’, coming after the First World, including the US and its allies, and the Second World, including the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc partners; as ‘non-DIAC countries, i.e. not belonging to the Development Assistance Committee of Western donors; or as ‘postcolonial donors’, which, however, does not manage to capture the different positioning of Southern countries vis-à-vis donorship and aid reception.

Against this backdrop, the categorisation of the Global South has existed since the mid-1970s, effectively indicating the changing power relations of this groups of countries with the Global North. With respect to the ‘East’ – a notion tentatively incorporating diverse realities but nowadays embedding them in the Orientalistic discourse first advanced by Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said (1978) – the Global South better allows for multi-directional flows of economic, cultural, and political capital between different countries, and therefore anthropology is surely well placed to explore such multi-directional flows. However, the definition of the Global South has too often been misleadingly reduced to a marginal or anti-imperial positionality, independent from context. In particular, in a bid to learn about and consider different Souths (from an intentionally plural perspective), Global South should not be our episteme – the point of departure for enlarging our knowledge about such a concept. It is in this regard that some scholars have opted for a conception of the Global South as ‘not an exact geographical designation, but as an idea and a set of practices, attitudes, and relations’ (Grovogu, 2011) or ‘a linguistic family, a belief system and an epistemology’ (Mignolo, 2015).

It may be helpful to examine a world map and reflect on the very geographic characteristics of the countries that are included in the Global South category. For instance, given that Australia is a political pole of the Global North, just as China is for the Global South, physical geography cannot fully explain what North and South are, since these categories refer not only to places but also, more importantly, to different political projects related to development and humanitarian action.

As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley highlight in their introduction to the Routledge Handbook of South-South Relations, the present South-South cooperation and its underlying principles are historically associated with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles around the world: ‘The emergence of a South-South cooperation was originally conceptualized as a way to overcome the exploitative character of North-South relations through diverse models of transnational cooperation and solidarity developed since the 1950s and 1960s, including internationalist, socialist, and regional approaches and initiatives such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism’. Dahi and Velasco have recently pointed out that, in the decades following World War II, between the 1950s and the late-1980s, South-South trade represented roughly 5–10% of all global trade, but, by 2013, that share had risen to 54%. Over the same period, the direction of these exports shifted to other Southern countries, while global South-South financial flows also increased substantially. This shared interest in mutual collaboration in the Global South, presently championed by Northern actors (that purport to act as facilitators) is also reflected in the so-called ‘localisation agenda’ promoted by the international humanitarian apparatus, as endorsed during the 2016 Istanbul World Humanitarian Summit. At the ‘Africa Stories: Changing Perceptions’ workshop held at University College London in June 2018, Michael Amoah, from the London School of Economics, confirmed Dahi and Velasco’s findings by contending that, in its current form, regional solidarity ideologies like pan-Africanism imply a new material inter-relationality, namely a new shared political economy between African countries, rather than an exclusive political ideology.

Thinking of South-South Cooperation (SSC), which is today incorporated in the framework of the United Nations (UNOSSC), the member states own different levels of economic development (the so-called ‘Human Development Index’) and are viewed as being located at different stages of democratic transition. Many countries partaking in the SSC are, at the same time, both aid donors and aid recipients. Some of those that are also donors do not wish to be defined as such, since such terminology is loaded with negative connotations associated with the Northern aid industry. In this sense, grouping the different realities that form an imaginary South under the banner of ‘emerging’ or ‘non-traditional donors’ is anti-historical as it represents the Northern neglect of a Southern history of assistance, which has similarly been developing for a long time.

In the light of this, should we endeavour to modify the categories ‘South’ and ‘North’ and work towards new definitions that can still grasp power relations without dooming countries to essentialised geopolitical positions? Or, rather, should we liberate the ‘South’ from negative connotations and the ‘North’ from positive biases? North and South are very telling with regard to our mental and cultural maps, not always encompassing the different technical, economic, political, and cultural assets and deficiencies that these political geographies present.

The emergence of UNOSSC is only one symptom of the increasing claim to postcolonial solidarity within the South and between the North and the South. Similarly, it can partially indicate the difference of the South from the North in the way that development and humanitarian assistance are thought about and implemented. These debates go beyond the realms of global economy, international relations, and politics; instead, they relate to the way in which ordinary people conceive of, explain, and concretely manage ideas and issues related to development and crisis management. In March 2018, I had the opportunity to speak with Syrian and Lebanese aid and service providers in Lebanon, among whom were three religious authorities engaging in assistance to Syrian refugees, and meaningful ways of understanding the services funded or managed by countries in the Global North or Global South emerged.

For instance, for a Syrian Sunni sheikh from Homs (western Syria), now managing a school in Tripoli, governance and markets represent the substantial differences between aid actors. He asserted that, in the Global South, governments are more present, while, in the Global North, there are private assistance initiatives that have their own rules and independence. Assistance in the Global North therefore ends up being random (ashwa’iy), reflecting an unleashed labour market behind assistance provision: ‘paying rents, employees, careers, and so on’.

A Lebanese Greek-Orthodox priest who provides aid to refugees and vulnerable citizens on a discontinuous basis in the city of Halba (northern Lebanon) expressed his way of thinking about the South in relation to the aid he provides in terms of what is outside of the Global North. However, he pointed out that, to him, in the mind of the beneficiaries, there is no difference with regard to the source of help and they do not distinguish between actors: ‘If you do lots of sponsoring, eventually your name is going to stick in their minds, but people do not really separate out providers in terms of principles and motivations, only whether the political campaign is massive, e.g. services coming from Saudi Arabia […] in this case, the image easily sticks in their minds, but they don’t know the name of the organisations involved most of the time. I personally think that what differs for Southern and Northern providers is the funding: it is sustainable for UNHCR but certainly not for us. They have governments supporting them, [whereas] we just have the Lebanese government, which neglects us. In that sense, I would identify as a Southern provider’.

Another Lebanese Greek-Orthodox priest working for a branch of the Ministry of Social Affairs in Halba raised the issue of global power holders imagining one homogenous South while departing from the idea of several Northern perspectives: ‘The Global North is the macro-picture for the politics we mostly hear about. As Lebanese providers with few means and little funding, we’re just numbers to be taken care of: I’m a Muslim in the eyes of the West, even though I’m Greek-Orthodox, because we, Middle-Eastern people, are all Muslims in the eyes of outsiders. Instead, I don’t feel there’s a shared understanding or feeling of the East, of the South, as you prefer to put it: there’s no homogeneity outside of the North. I don’t feel any proximity to Asian or African countries, especially to the Arab Gulf, which has its own interests here. Moreover, as a Greek-Orthodox, I have little to do with Arabness’.

The Syrian director of a school in a Tripoli neighbourhood (northern Lebanon) similarly stated: ‘I don’t feel closer to the Arab states with respect to Canada just because we’re all Arabs. Arab states haven’t been supportive at all toward Syrian refugees. I think the real difference between assistance provided by Northern and Southern countries is our hijra [migration with spiritual connotations, related to the migration of the Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD]. The South migrates, and the North doesn’t accept us, even if we are qualified and have culture’.

A Syrian service provider in Tripoli proposed that ‘Northern’ or ‘Southern’ mean something in relation to the social, political, and emotional positionality of the provider: ‘The real difference is not the country we talk about; it’s rather our human condition. It’s about sharing nationality and issues with the displaced you assist [and is] nothing to do with East and West, South and North […]. Beneficiaries identify with countries of reception primarily on the basis of their political position; for example, if I get stuff from Turkey, as a Syrian opponent, I feel closer to Turkey. If you get aid from Saudi Arabia or Qatar, you will prefer one of them if you are a salafi (a follower of Salafism) or ikhwenji (from the Muslim Brotherhood) respectively. So, there’s politics behind our proximity to a country. In this sense, I don’t think I have anything to share with the ‘other South’. As a Syrian, Syria is my Global South’.

Reflecting on the various understandings of ‘Southern-led provision’ is relevant insofar as it allows us to grasp the complex social and political positionalities of assistance providers in the global framework of development and humanitarian action. In this sense, some contemporary academic debates merely re-consign agency to the vulnerable and the disenfranchised, e.g. by seeing Southern actors and refugees as inherently ‘different aid providers’ or by aprioristically defining them as resilient. These debates are tiring at a time when ‘Southern agency’ is heralded as a human and an intellectual conquest of the Global North. Instead, a valuable point of departure may instead be acknowledging the existence of multiplicity and respecting what each side suggests – at times participating and at other times acting by oneself in the realm of development and humanitarian action.

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* This research has been conducted in the framework of the project “Analyzing South-South Humanitarian Responses to Displacement from Syria: Views from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey”, funded by the European Research Council under the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation agreement no. 715582.

Inquiring and writing about migration and smuggling: an interview with Peter Tinti

Luigi Achilli (L.A.): You belong to the most prolific reporters covering conflict, security, human rights, and organized crime issues. I read in your personal website that, in 2013, Action on Armed Violence included you in its list “Top 100: The most influential journalists covering armed violence.” What is it about violence, crime, and conflict that drew you to write about these topics?

Peter Tinti (P.T.): The September 11, 2001 attacks happened during my last year of high school. As someone who studied political science and international relations in college, 9/11 and its consequences were, for better or worse, the backdrop to my entire education. Issues related to conflict, terrorism, and violence by non-state actors were omnipresent.

On a more personal level, the collapse of Mali, a country where I had lived for several years, first from 2008 to 2011 as a Peace Corps Volunteer, and again in 2013 as a journalist, was searing. A lot of people, from academics to diplomats to development practitioners to Malian government officials, were heavily invested in the narrative of Mali as a democratic model for the region. And yet, so much of what these smart, supposedly earnest people were saying and writing proved fabulously wrong.

I think both examples, the aftermath of 9/11 and Mali, are what make me inherently skeptical of consensus narratives. I’m always ready to accept that the frameworks we use to view the world can suddenly, rapidly, feel obsolete. The challenge as a journalist, at least as I see it, is to find better frameworks and alternative voices to better understand the world around us.

I think this is particularly important when we think about the current “migration crisis” and migrant smuggling. There is an inherent tension between the urgency and novelty of the moment, what constitutes a “crisis” for the people involved, and the need to place it within a broader, more measured context.

 

L.A.: Along with Tuesday Reitano, you recently authored the book “Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Savior” (2017 – Oxford University Press). How did you end up writing this book? What are its main goals, its accomplishment, and its shortcoming?

P.T.: The book was an outgrowth of our ongoing research for the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, of which Tuesday is a co-founder. I had done some previous reporting on migrant smuggling networks in West Africa before what came to be known as the “migrant crisis,” but the subject matter took on a new urgency with the explosion of the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2015. Tuesday has been examining issues of transnational organized crime and migrant smuggling for much longer, so she already had deep understanding of some of these issues. I was rapidly bringing myself up to speed as I carried out interviews in North Africa, Turkey, the Balkans and Western Europe.

When Tuesday and I set out to write the book, our main goal was to help readers, whether they be the general public or policymakers, better understand the role that migrant smugglers are playing in facilitating the irregular movement of migrants and refugees. While we didn’t think of the book as a corrective, per se, we did believe that many of the prevailing narratives about smugglers and the migrant smuggling industry were not only incorrect, but counterproductive.

I think we succeeded in helping readers better understand how migrant smuggling works, the different types of actors involved, the shape and structure of some of the main networks facilitating irregular migration into Europe. We wanted people to understand that tens of millions of people around the world are living in precarious situations of protracted, indefinite displacement, and that the international community has failed them. Rather than wait indefinitely for the international community to live up to its own obligations under international law, many of these people have decided to take matters into their own hands. With legal channels for movement limited or completely cut off, many of these people have little choice but to seek the services of smugglers who can help them reach safety and opportunity. It is this pool of displaced and disposed people, and the complete failure of the international system to help these people, that is creating unprecedented demand for smuggler services.

The actors who operate within various smuggling markets carry out their activities along a spectrum of criminality that includes low-level opportunists who seize an impromptu chance to make a quick buck, to highly sophisticated experts who can obtain passports and paperwork for the right price. Some smugglers are highly exploitative and have little regard for their human cargo. Others take pride in their work, operate with professionalism, and are held in high regard by the men, women and children they help reach safety (even if they did so in exchange for payment).

We also wanted readers to understand how polices that seek to block asylum seekers and target smugglers, but do nothing to address the underlying conditions that create demand for smuggler services, are ineffective and counterproductive. In fact, when the borders and barriers to irregular migration increase, but the circumstances that necessitate movement remain constant, lower-level opportunists are pushed out of the smuggling market because the new barriers exceed their criminal skills. Only those with requisite criminal expertise can operate and organized criminal groups, many of which are already involved in activities such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and human trafficking, takeover the market and make unprecedented profits.

In terms of shortcomings, I am not sure the book offers the “answers” or “solutions” that many might be looking for. We do analyze the negative impact of certain policies, and we do consider how certain policies might yield unintended consequences, but we refrain from offering a one-size-fits-all solution. Additionally, Tuesday and I came at this work from different backgrounds, so what we consider one of the book’s strengths—the balance between accessibility, timeliness, and rigor—other audiences might view as a weakness. We do cite and reference academic articles throughout the first section of the book, but we do not grapple with existing academic literature or theories of organized crime and irregular migration in ways that academics might prefer.

 

L.A.: The book is one of those rare examples of writings aimed to a broader audience that goes beyond the sensationalism surrounding the rhetoric of human smuggling. It critically engages with the figure of the migrant smuggler while problematizing the simplistic generalizations and representations connected to the phenomenon. In your view, why there is such a discrepancy between informed accounts like yours and mainstream narratives of human smuggling and irregular migration?

 P.T.: In academia, scholarship is an ongoing conversation among experts. It might take place at the speed of annual conferences and peer review, but it is, by and large, taking place in good faith. There are standards and structures in place to actually disincentive sensationalism, and the rewards go to those who do good work.

Regretfully, this is not necessarily the case in journalism, especially since the business models of newspapers and magazines have collapsed in recent years. The monetary incentives at the moment, which often privilege page views and shares on social media, reward the sensational. Those who do great work are still often recognized and lauded by their peers, but they also might go out of business.

While the discrepancy between informed accounts and mainstream narratives is not unique to human smuggling and irregular migration, I do think these particular topics—replete with images of overcrowded boats or masses of foreigners who look different and might practice a different religion—do lend themselves to sensationalism.

I guess the prevailing question, then, is what is the best response to sensationalism. I’m all for calling out the worst examples on social media or in letters to editors, but it seems like the best response in the long term is to counter them with better journalism and scholarship.

Rather than highlight the problematic narratives, Tuesday and I set out to write an accurate one for a general audience. We said in the introduction that our book sits somewhere between a work of journalism and social science, and that it was neither a call to action nor a work of moral outrage. We wanted to write something that is accessible but also challenges readers. That’s why it was important for me that we constantly weave in the characters involved, both migrants and smugglers, so that readers understood that we are talking about real people, not faceless actors operating in the shadows or hidden among the masses.

 

L.A.: Your work involves multi-sited research in increasingly dangerous zones. How did you approach research participants and conduct your investigation? Have there been any dangerous situations during your work?  How did you deal with those?

Depending on the location, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel, I usually make arrangements with people in advance who can introduce me to some of the actors involved. In other cases, such as in the Balkans or in Calais, it can be as straightforward as showing up and asking questions and developing relationships from there. In every case, the key is to establish some sort of trust with people who can help you better understand what is going on.

Mitigating risk and danger is always a complex endeavor. In places that are unambiguously dangerous, I make sure I work with fixers and translators who have a proven track record of working in hostile environments. In places like northern Niger and Mali, I’ve worked with a lot of different interlocutors, and I’m constantly reassessing where I can go and how long I should stay in a certain place while I’m there.

In 2015, for example, I was in Agadez, northern Niger, with a film crew and it was hard for us to keep a low profile given our equipment. The shoot was taking a bit longer than anticipated, and a few of us stayed behind to follow-up on a promising lead. I received a phone call from a Nigerien contact I had met with during a previous trip and with whom I occasionally text. He is not someone I completely trust, and he associates with some sketchy actors who split their time between northern Niger and southern Libya. I had not told him I would be in Agadez, but when he called, he told me that he heard I was in town and asked how long I would be there. It turns out someone else in Agadez notified him of our presence, and now he wanted to know our itinerary and where we were staying. I told him we had already left northern Niger, and then we immediately changed locations for the evening. We left the next day.

 

L.A.: Did you have a translator with you? And how important are translators for your daily work?

 P.T.: I prefer not to have a translator whenever possible, which for me, means finding people who speak English (or often, broken English) or French. Tuesday and I also hired local researchers to carry out fieldwork on our behalf in certain locations. Beyond being able to overcome language barriers, local researchers can be invaluable in navigating the socio-cultural landscape. I have no doubt, for example, that some refugee and migrant women we interviewed were much more comfortable sharing their experiences with a woman than with me.

 

L.A.: As your work involves enquire into criminal business, it steps into a delicate field where ethical and safety issues are of the outmost importance. Since the late 1960s, anthropologists have begun taking seriously the ethical dilemmas entailed in working and living in a world fraught with political turmoil. Today, when anthropologists carry out their researches, they face a whole set of ethical issues including – but not limited to – the need of protecting the autonomy, wellbeing, and dignity of all research participants whose safety our research might endanger. As a journalist, what ethical dilemmas did you confront? And how did you did deal with those?

 P.T.: Unlike in academia, where various disciplines have well-defined, if evolving, ethical standards and researchers are subject to institutional review boards, ethics in journalism is much less clearly defined. Most reputable outlets, broadly speaking, have similar standards and subscribe to similar codes of ethics, and most reputable journalists adhere to them, but heady concepts such as “the public interest” and “newsworthiness” can be pretty murky.

Generally speaking, my main preoccupation is making sure that my own reporting does not put anyone in danger or cause harm. That’s the minimum. For this book, we granted anonymity to anyone who wanted it, and in some cases I assigned pseudonyms to people who, despite the fact that they knew I was a journalist, might not have had a clear understanding the extent to which the information they gave me would be made public. Some of these people were talking to me only minutes after surviving a boat crossing, or as they were preparing to place their lives in the hands of a smuggler, and I constantly reminded myself of that.

A lot of newspaper editors and magazine editors would probably not be comfortable with the levels of anonymity we granted, and I don’t blame them. It makes these stories nearly impossible to fact-check, but for me, it was the only way we could write this book in a way that was truthful and ethical. Some of the people we reference, for example, were in the process of applying for asylum, and I did not want our book to potentially complicate their lives in any way.

 

L.A.: Let us talk about your work one more time. During their fieldwork, researchers usually develop a strong empathy and a sense of personal responsibility for the peoples they study and live with. Neutrality or activism. This dilemma has led scholars like Nancy Scheper-Hughes to question the idea that field researchers can be neutral, detached, and objective observers. In your work, how do you strike a balance (if you do) between being the neutral observing reporter and the engaging, sympathetic human being?

P.T.: I personally do not have much interest in objectivity when it comes to my work. The most important thing for me is that my writing and reporting is factual, accurate, and fair. I actively avoid chasing a false sense of neutrality, because I think it is a slippery slope to inaccuracy. That’s my own preference, and it informs the types of stories I choose to work on. But not everyone prefers this approach, and that is fine.

One ethical dilemma I am always facing, however, is to what extent it is acceptable to ask people to recount or relive traumatic experiences. During recent trips to Libya and Honduras, this was constantly in the back of my mind as men and women were telling me about being tortured and terrorized. How do I justify asking them to incur the emotional and psychological costs of talking to me? I think that is a question that not enough journalists ask themselves.

 

L.A.: Over the past years, the EU member states have developed controversial governmental policies to respond to the refugee and migration movements. What is your take on Europe’s current role in the so-called migrant crisis? From your reporting over the past years, what do you think would be a more ethical and effective European response to the current crisis?

 P.T.: I’m highly critical of the EU responses to refugee and migration movements. When it comes to refugees, I don’t think these are complicated or complex phenomena. You either believe in the 1951 Refugee Convention or you don’t. I find debates over the “politics” of this tiresome and, to be honest, disingenuous. So much of what European policymakers and commentators are framing as clear-eyed realism is really just an exercise in rationalizing why it is acceptable to ignore obligations under international law. The fact that Europe is collaborating with unaccountable militias in Libya, Sudanese security forces, and a range of other unsavory actors in order to stem the flow of refugees speaks for itself.

The most effective way for Europe, and the broader international community, to reduce the number of refugees arriving would be to commit resources to ending and preventing the types of conflicts and situations that produce mass refugee populations, and to address the needs of populations who have found themselves living in situations of protracted displacement. It would require leadership and investing in the types of institutions and structures that can adequately address these issues. That’s easier said than done, but I don’t think anyone can say with a straight face that the international community has committed sufficient resources and energy toward reducing the global pool of refugees and displaced persons. Before we dismiss such proposals, I would at least like to see them tried.

Now, when it comes to economic migrants, that is a much trickier question and one over which I think reasonable people can disagree. It ultimately comes down to whether European countries want to provide safe, legal opportunities for migrants from developing countries to access European labor markets. My personal opinion is that those countries that do, and do it well, will benefit tremendously. But given the current political climate in Europe, even those policymakers who agree with this in theory seem more concerned with finding ways to curb migration for the sake of political expediency.

 

L.A.: Beyond the European context, what do you believe is a realistic approach to irregular migration worldwide? And what do you think would be an ideal solution to human smuggling?

P.T.: These are the types of questions I always try to avoid, in part because people have radically different interpretations of “realistic” and “ideal solution.” The “solutions” question can be particularly dangerous, because it often means tacitly accepting someone else’s framing of the “problem.” When European policymakers ask me what they can do to combat migrant smuggling, for example, they aren’t actually interested in any solution that means taking in more migrants or making migration easier for prospective migrants.

As we say in the book, smugglers exist because in the world we have created, tens of millions of people have deemed them necessary in order to live safe, productive lives. They are the supply in a time of unprecedented demand. The solution to human smuggling, therefore, is to render them unnecessary. For refugees, that would mean providing safe, legal channels for them to reach safety and to escape scenarios of indefinite, protracted displacement. And for economic migrants, that would mean providing more safe and legal opportunities for migration while committing to making the world a radically more equitable place across the globe.

Now, if you do believe that political or security imperatives demand hard borders and restrictions on movement, then you need to accept that human smugglers are going to exist. That’s the tradeoff. People need to and want to move, and restricting their movement means that smugglers will step in to provide services that allow them to reach safety and opportunity. But even within this framing, policymakers and law enforcement officials could adopt a “do no harm” approach. That is, European policymakers could consider if a given policy is likely to put migrants in danger or empower the most exploitative actors within the migrant smuggling economy. If the answer is yes, and it almost always is unless the policy is coupled with actions that credibly engage the drivers of migration and displacement, then moral imperatives might dictate that the policy be discarded.

That’s not a solution, but it would so much better than the status quo.

Suggested by Public Anthropologist – Searching for a Better Life

Searching for a Better Life. Growing Up in the Slums of Bangkok by Sorcha Mahony is an engaging but highly readable ethnography of youth in Thailand’s capital.

What does searching for a better life mean for those struggling to get by in a rapidly developing and globalizing economy? How do they try to fulfil their dreams? And how do they deal with the outcomes and side effects of their endeavours?

By avoiding sensationalism and by penetrating the everyday dimension of a group of slum dwellers in Bangkok, Mahony develops a reflection along three main axes: living the teenage life, doing the right thing, and forging the future. These translate into forms of engagement in global cultural practices, in local cultural practices, and in educational and economic activity designed to reduce hardship and improve material standards of living

As searching for a better life is currently a dominant concept on the global level, this book is a welcome contribution to scholarly and public debates on inequality and struggles for change.