International migration is a controversial political and policy agenda, leading to the adoption of different policy measures in both sending and receiving countries. This blog takes the case of Ethiopia and examines the contexts and interplay between migration policy measures and international migration phenomena in sending countries. Particularly, the blog analyses the evolution of Ethiopia’s migration-related legal instruments and their contexts and assumptions on the one hand, and how human traffickers and employment agencies devise creative methods to circumvent and bypass the existing laws on the other. In short, I argue that despite the enactment of various polices and proclamations, irregular migration has been perpetuating, not declining in importance.
Currently, the international outward migration of Ethiopian youth is unfolding against the backdrop of a number of interrelated factors, including high level of population growth, youth unemployment, and rural-urban migration. International migration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Ethiopia and was shaped and facilitated by two main factors: first, the overthrow of the military regime in 1991 and the subsequent coming to power of a liberal government; and second, the demand for migrant labor in the oil rich Gulf countries and the immigrant (refugee) friendly policies that were pursued by the post-apartheid government of the Republic of South Africa during the 1990s.
The Evolution of Ethiopian Migration Policies
Ethiopians leave their country and try to reach their destination via regular routes, irregular routes, or a combination of both. Irregular migration is undertaken through three major routes: the Northern route (to Europe); the Eastern route (to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries); and the Southern route (to South Africa).
The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has attempted to regulate international migration to other countries with the aim of maximizing the benefits that migration brings to the country and safeguard the wellbeing of migrant workers. To do this, the GoE implemented a number of different policies: The 1998 Private Employment Agency (PEA) Proclamation aimed to facilitate employment abroad and better protect the rights, safety and dignity of Ethiopians via private agencies – this was followed by The 2009 Employment Exchange Services Proclamation which addressed the limitations in the 1998 proclamation. In October 2013, overseas employment was banned in response to the massive deportation of “undocumented” migrant workers from Saudi Arabia. The Anti-trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation was adopted in 2015 to address irregular migration, and aim for the “Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Person and Smuggling of Migrants”. In 2016, the Overseas Employment Proclamation was adopted to safeguard the rights, safety, and dignity of Ethiopian workers abroad. Finally, the revised Anti-trafficking and smuggling Proclamation was adopted in 2020 to address the limitation of the 2015 Anti-Trafficking Law.
Loopholes in Ethiopia’s migration policies and the perpetuation of irregular migration
Despite Ethiopia’s enactment of migration policies and its proclamation to regulate the operation of international migration by both attempting to legalize overseas employment opportunities and fight against irregular migration and human trafficking and smuggling, individuals continue leaving the country in huge numbers. As demonstrated in figure one below, the number of Ethiopians arriving in Yemen rose between 2011 and 2012, before dropping in 2013. However, irregular migration increased again in the period to 2016 after Ethiopia introduced the ban on legal labor migration to the Middle East and the anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamation in 2015.
Figure 1: Estimated Number of Illegal Migrants in 2011-2016

Source: RMMS (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat)
This increasing irregular migration is linked both to the “regulatory failure” of the state (like the weaknesses found in the formulation of the policies and to their implementation) (see, Castles 2004, cited in Fernandez, 2013:817); and to the agency of actors involved in the migration phenomenon, namely, individual migrants, employers, and such intermediaries as registered Private Employment Agencies (PEAs), unregistered brokers, and social networks. These actors attempt to exploit the existing regulating policies (or their lack) to their advantage.
For instance, PEAs failed to establish a legal representative in the receiving country. PEAs were found to be carrying out activities in clear violation of the 2009 proclamation, namely, receipt of payments and benefits, the claim to cover all expenses, the provision of insufficient protection to migrant workers in the employment, and collaboration with agencies and individuals in the destination that were known for human trafficking or were working closely with traffickers. Similarly, PEAs were not providing any assistance to migrants when they faced difficulties in the course of employment, rather they were part of the problem, as they were threatening migrants into continue working or return and face financial penalty.
However, these financial and administrative requirements have become sources of grievances and illegal conduct by private agencies. So much so that not many agencies were operating due to the high deposits they had to save as a guarantee for workers’ rights. The unattainable amount of deposit money has also forced many agencies to go underground. The October 2013 ban did not deter Ethiopians from trying to enter to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states via alternative means. Migrants, with the help of traffickers and smugglers, travelled to Kenya and Tanzania as an alternative route. During the ban, agents and brokers were using business and tourist visas to move people from Ethiopia to the Gulf States – the Ethiopian government’s recognition of this ‘creative’ trend apparently facilitated the lifting of the ban in 2018. Although the revised overseas employment was issued in 2016, it took two more years before legal employment was granted and private employment agencies were allowed to once again.
Most importantly, migration policies were also shaped more by external factors than by internal factors; and as such, appeared to reflect the former’s universal norms and values. The Ethiopian PEA proclamation was introduced after the adoption of International Labor Organization’s (ILO) convention on Private Employment Agencies (No. 181/1997). The anti-trafficking and smuggling proclamation came out three years after Ethiopia ratified the two Protocols relevant to international migration that supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. This proclamation was also supported by western powers as it is in line with their interest of stemming the flow of irregular migrants from reaching their shores.
Finally, the various proclamations issued by the government to regulate the legal migration of its nationals have not been backed up by the necessary financial, human and institutional arrangement and capacity. The management of migration in Ethiopia has not been treated and inculcated as an integral part of the country’s development endeavors.
In conclusion, although the laws and policies passed from the 1998 PEAs proclamation down to the recent 2020 Revised Anti-trafficking and smuggling Proclamation to manage migration appear to be progressive in nature, they also reveal important interplay between structure-agency. The formulation of laws and policies at structural level (with all their inherent limitations) have triggered the agency of non-state actors – like migrants, PEAs and human traffickers and smugglers – to devise ways of circumventing the constraints posed by the policies, inhabiting the implementation of the laws and policies put in place.
This motivates the Ethiopian state to analyze its migration policies and systems critically, and in their entirety – including the implications, benefits and costs of proposed policies. The state also needs to assess its will and capacity, so that both the state and the other actors involved could benefit.
